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K.J. Shapiro

veterinarian, an ethicist, and a person
from the animal welfare community. The
guidelines would include the provision of
a class of experiments that are expressly
prohibited on grounds independent of
consequentialist or utilitarian considerations. In the British psychologist Dr. Alice
Heim's term, certain experimental procedures are "intrinsically objectionable."
They belong to a category of investigations where ends do not justify the
means, where the rights of an individual
must trump those of any aggregate- human or otherwise. It would be the responsibility of the local animal care committees to decide what specific proposed
research belongs in this category.
If an experimental procedure were
deemed permissible on this first ground,
it would then be scrutinized on more
strictly scientific grounds. Is it "good
science?" Does it measure what it purports to? Is any intended extrapolation
to human phenomena compelling or reasonable?
Finally, the proposed research
would be assessed on utilitarian grounds.
Do its potential benefits outweigh its
costs? Costs and benefits would include
those incurred by nonhuman animals,
particularly those involved in the experiment, and the burden to reduce those
costs would fall on the scientist proposing the research. It is his or her responsibility to demonstrate that he has considered and explored all possible "alternatives." If he can first meet the criterion of justifying the particular use of
animals that is involved, he must then
also demonstrate that he is employing
the least intrusive procedure that is likely to obtain the effect he proposes to
study.
Implicit in these suggestions is an
acceptance of the principle that any
proposed experimental procedure is
vulnerable to the competing claims of
the animal subjects it requires, a principle long ago accepted with respect to
the use of human subjects.
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In the final analysis, the level of exploitation of animals that we will countenance is a social decision. However, I
have been impressed with philosophy's
role in bringing these particular issues to
our attention and in offering further
leads as to what our relation to other
animals can and ought to be. To complete these remarks, I would like to
point to some leads in this philosophical
literature which I feel deserve further
development.
It has been the tactic of much of
this literature to delve into the nature of
the boundary that we have set up between human and nonhuman animalstypically, either extending that boundary by critically challenging and then
lowering the traditional criteria as to
what kind of being is a fit object of
moral concern, or by "discovering" that
certain animals have had those traditional attributes all along that would let
them pass, if not as persons, at least as
individuals worthy of our moral consideration. In contrast to this focus, Hans
Jonas (in The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology, 1966) implies that we might well shift the locus
of our operations. In a brilliant chapter
entitled "To Move and to Feel," Jon as
directs us away from the defense or
capitulation of any supposedly peculiarly human territory to the distinction between animal and plant, in his terms, between "the animate" and "the inanimate."
He finds that the point of departure
of the "phenomenon of animality" from
the "vegetative mode of life" resides in
a concept of distance. Very briefly, on
motility and perception is built the
distance or gap between urge and attainment, between desire and satisfaction;
and in this deferred fulfillment is the
ground for purpose and emotion. Animality, then, is a state of being for which
the temporal and spatial distance of objects constitute a "world," as distinguished from the plant's relation to an
environment that is merely contiguous
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with itself. "The suffering intrinsic in
animal existence is thus primarily not
that of pain ... but that of want and fear"
(p. 1 OS) as his or her purposes may be
frustrated or threatened.
This ontology of animality implies
an obligation on the part of scientists to
study particular animal species in their

natural habitats. Only in this way can we
begin to grasp just what it is we deprive
them of when we place them in a lab
and make them the subjects of our experimentation. A less expl-oitative and
more sensitive ethic must be built on
such considerations.

Genetic Adaptation and Welfare
J. Van Rooijen
1. Van Rooijen is with the Department of Animal Husbandry, Agricultural University, Marijkeweg 40, 6079 PC
Wagingen, The Netherlands.

Introduction
Beilharz (1982) has pointed out that
into new kinds of environments, he states
it may be possible to adapt animals genthat, if individuals do not have the capaetically to existing husbandry systems,
city to adjust phenotypically, "adaptation
rather than adapt the systems to the aniof the population will require a rapid
mals, in order to improve animal welfare. · genetic response to prevent dying out of
While I am in fundamental agreement with
the population." This comment may sugBeilharz' way of thinking (Van Rooijen,
gest that one does not have to wait very
1982a), I am afraid that his statements
long for the animals to adapt successfulmay easily be misunderstood.
ly to intensive systems. He also notes
Beilharz says: "The evolutionary prothat it is likely that a rapid genetic recesses, if they are not obstructed or
sponse is accompanied by much "suffermisdirected, must lead to such a degree
ing." From this, one might conclude that
of adaptation that welfare will have to
suffering during such a process is only
be taken for granted, just as we can do
"natural," and is therefore justified.
no better than to take for granted the
Beilharz writes further that the prowelfare of any wild animal in its natural
cedure of adaptation "may have to be
habitat." From this statement, one might
approached in stages, if the environmenconclude all we have to do is wait, and
tal conditions aimed at are radically difthe animals will eventually adapt to inferent from those to which the animals
tensive systems. Concerning animals put
are now adapted." Because he fails to
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tell us whether intensive husbandry systems belong in this last category of environmental conditions, one might conclude that it is not necessary to adapt
animals in stages if they are to be kept
under intensive conditions.
Therefore, because these statements
of Beilharz could be misused to defend
the practice of keeping animals under
the stress of intensive conditions, under
the rationalization that this is part of a
long-term rational plan, I want to discuss each of these statements in the following comment.

Are Wild Animals in Nature
Happy All the Time?
Beilharz feels that we can take for
granted the welfare of any wild animal
living in its natural habitat. He writes: "I
believe that we can do no better than to
assume that the welfare of any adapted
form of life is guaranteed, i.e., that it
does not suffer in its particular environment." This assertion might give rise to
the idea that wild animals are happy all
the time. However, I do not believe that
this idea (which seems to be inspired by
Rousseau) is correct. In fact, wild animals are sometimes compelled to fight
with rivals for food, sexual partner, nest
site, etc.; they may return to find their
nests empty because their young have
been killed by a predator; they may
break a leg in an accident; they may
have to endure lengthy periods of bad
weather; and so on.
Among some species of fish, each
female lays, during her lifetime, millions
of eggs. In steady-state populations, only two individuals out of all of her offspring (on average) will have the opportunity to reproduce again. We can assume that many of the other individuals
that do survive to reproduce will be likely to suffer for shorter or longer periods
of time. Lorz (1973, cited in Van Putten,
1981) has defined the welfare of an animal as: "Living in harmony with the environment and with itself, both physical192
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ly and psychologically." I agree with Beilharz that, if animals are living in an environment into which they fit, and with
which they are in harmony, we may assume that they experience a certain degree of welfare. But even adapted forms
are not always in harmony with the environment to which they are adapted; harmony and adaptation must be construed
as two separate parameters.

Is Reproduction the Same as
Welfare?
Beilharz cites Tschanz, who has
written that the best measurement of
adaptation to an environment is reproduction. Beilharz writes: "There is no doubt
that, on basis of this criterion, there are
poultry and pigs that are quite well
adapted to intensive farming."
Indeed, reproduction offers a good
index for comparing the adaptedness of
individuals within a population but, at
the same time, one must recall that this
is a quite different concept from the
idea of harmony. The term "adapted animals," when used in this sense, does not
mean animals that are in harmony with
their environment and themselves but,
rather, that animals simply show a high
degree of fitness. Fitness and welfare
often coincide, but a one-for-one overlap is not necessarily the case (Dawkins,
1979; Van Rooijen, 1982). An example
will serve to make this clearer. One may
compare two bulls, one ranging free on
an island with some cows, and one kept
under very adverse circumstances- but
from the latter, each sperm is used for
artificial insemination. The reproduction
rate of the second bull is obviously
much better than that of the first one,
but, with respect to their welfare, the
reverse is true.
Beilharz writes: "In fact, if we could
free ourselves of our human prejudices
and take a broad perspective, we would
find that in evolution, the interaction of
domestic animals with humans has been
a very successful form of symbiosis, beINTI STUD ANIM PROB 4(3) 1983
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cause neither human beings nor domestic
animals would be present in the same
huge numbers without the others." This
sentence suggests that, if we permit ourselves to take a very narrow perspective
instead, and do not free ourselves from
our human prejudices, we would find
that the human-domestic animal symbiosis
had been very unsuccessful, because so
many animals are suffering.
In actuality, there is merely an apparent contradiction in Beilharz' thinking. The fact that, biologically, domestic
animals have been very successful does
not exclude the possibility that this success may go hand in hand with suffering
in many animals.

over long periods of time. Further, changes
in the abiotic environment, that have occurred gradually (for instance, alterations in climate), may explain the evolution of some species.
We must realize, too, that adaptation processes are still at work in wild
animals that are living in their natural
habitats, animals whose welfare Beilharz
assumes is guaranteed. This situation
has existed for long periods during the
evolutionary history of each species.
Therefore, I doubt whether, in the greater
portion of the history of I ife on earth,
animals have suffered more during adaptation than do present-day animals in natural habitats.

Is Suffering During the Process
of Adaptation //Natural"?

Is Suffering During the Process of
Adaptation Ethically justified If It
Turns Out to Be /'Natural"?

Beilharz states: "The evolutionary processes, if they are not obstructed or
misdirected, must lead to such a degree
of adaptation that welfare must be taken
for granted. But he also writes that it is
very likely that these processes of adaptation are accompanied by much suffering.
These assertions may give the impression
that suffering during the process of adaptation is "natural."
Rapid changes in forms of life after
a rapid change in the environment have
actually been rare during evolution.
Rather, rapid changes in the environment of a species have most often resulted in an extinction of that species.
Only a few species have survived rapid
changes, not because they also managed
to change rapidly, but largely because
they already possessed certain traits
that allowed them to remain unaffected
by the new change in the environment.
Also, most of the changes in the various
forms of life have occurred only very
slowly. They are often the result of a
continuous interaction between two species, for instance, a predator and a prey
species, or a parasite and a host. During
such an interaction, both species continuously adapt themselves to each other
/NT I STUD ANIM PROB 4(3) 1983

Some predators kill their prey in a
way that would give rise to considerable
opposition if this method were to be
practiced by humans: What we find acceptable in nature is not always held to
be equally acceptable in relation to the
animals that are placed under our care.
Therefore, because nature can never be
held up as our ultimate ethical standard,
it does not really matter whether suffering during adaptation occurs in nature
or not.

Does a New Environment Induce
a Rapid/ Genetic Change?
Beilharz states that if we put animals into a new environment, this change
will necessitate a rapid genetic response
to prevent a dying out of the entire population. This statement is teleological: it
implies that putting animals under intensive husbandry conditions will of necessity induce rapid genetic adaption.
Therefore, since the period of suffering
that occurs during this adaptation is of
brief duration, it could be asserted that
this treatment is ethically acceptable.
However, this view of things is Lamarc193
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kian. In contrast, the neo-Darwinistic
view holds that if populations enter a
new environment, the speed of their
adaptation will differ solely according
to random chance; only those populations
that serendipitously attain a high degree
of fitness to the new environment will
survive.
In nature, as a rule, the fitness of
those individuals that are more in harmony with their environment than others
will be greater than the fitness of individuals that are less in harmony with
their environment. In artificial situations, however, it is possible that animals will continue to survive, even
though they have not yet truly adapted
in the sense of living in harmony with
. their environment. This last point is important in regard to the question of suffering. We simply do not know beforehand
how long it will take for domestic animals to become sufficiently adapted to
intensive systems such that they not only survive, but are also in harmony with
these environments.

Is a Conventional Husbandry
System the Natural Environment
of a Domestic Animal?
To determine to what kinds of environments domestic animals have become adapted, I will list some characteristics of one selected species: the pig.
Because pigs easily become feral (Hanson and Karstad, 1959; Pullar, 1953), I
will also mention some of the characteristics of wild swine.
That pigs are adapted to environments that provide much more space
and variety than most conventional systems have to offer is indicated by some
data furnished by Wood (1865, cited in
Reiher, 1969). One person rode 4 Y2 miles
in 1 hour on a boar, and another person
drove 4 miles with a four-in-hand of
sows. A wild boar jumped over a wall of
9 feet, and a domestic pig scaled one of
4Y2 feet. Their desire for variety is also
indicated by the fact that pigs prefer
194
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some substrate over a bare concrete
floor, and that their preference for different substrates may show a diurnal
rhythm (Van Rooijen, 1981 b and 1983).
Meynhardt (1980) related how pigs are
kept by the fishermen of the Donaudelta. After a training period of 2 months, in
which they are taught to listen to a call
or whistle, these pigs are left free to
range over the Donaudelta. They soon
become completely feral and are very
difficult to approach. Yet in December,
the pigs are piloted home by use of the
call or whistle. During the last 1- to 2
miles, these pigs swim behind the boats
and then enter their pens without coercion. Pigs also easily learn to open a
gate by pressing on a plate with their
nose (Van Rooijen, 1983). But conventional systems make little use of the actual capacities of pigs.
Although some authors have supposed that pigs have poor sight (Ackerknecht, 1950; Mellen, 1950), more recent
research has shown, on the basis of morphological (Beauchemin, 1974) and behavioral (Klopfer, 1966) data, that the
pig eye is very much like the human eye.
Olfaction, however, is even better developed than in humans: domestic pigs are
able to follow human tracks (Reiher, 1969).
For wild pigs, this is said to be true even
if the tracks are several hours old (Snethlage, 1957). And most people know that
domestic pigs are used to locate truffles
(Rebiere, 1967). Also, the sense of hearing is better developed in pigs than in
humans. Meynhardt (1980) describes how
wild swine were able to localize acorns in
the dark without searching, solely on the
basis of the sound generated when the
acorns hit the ground. He further described how these swine, in the dark, removed the shells of the acorns.
In conventional systems, pigs are
often given only pellets to eat. But in
nature, wild swine eat a wide variety of
food (roots, the green parts of plants,
fruits, and small animals) and are described as connoisseurs: swine prefer
/NT I STUD ANIM PROB 4{3) 1983

J. VanRooijen

certain types of potatoes over other
types, and they like acorns most of all
but will eat American acorns only whe~
there are no European acorns left (Meynhardt, 1980).
Hunters ascribe to wild swine an
"almost humanlike logical ability" (Snethlage, 1957) or at least an intellectual
capacity equal to that ·of the red deer
(Kiessling, 1925). Yerkes and Coburn (1975)
stated that domestic pigs had "an approach to free ideas" that these rese~rch
workers had not in any way expected.
The intelligence of domestic pigs is
often said to be comparable to that of
dogs (Ackerkenecht, 1950; Mellen, 1950).
The capabilities of pigs are also demonstrated by the fact that wild boars are
used as bloodhounds (Guman Singh, 1956)
and domestic pigs as gundogs (Zeuner,
1963). Many more facts about pigs could
be mentioned, but my aim here has been
to indicate that there exists a considerable gap between the nature of the
niche to which pigs are actually adapted
and the environment found in conventional husbandry systems.
One may argue that most of these
data are derived from wild swine or uncommon breeds, and are therefore of less
value with respect to pigs kept in conventional systems. Of course, I have
noted some extraordinary cases, and 1
do not doubt that domestication has influenced pigs (Van Rooijen, 1982a). But
the thousands of years of domestication.
are negligible when compared with the
great span of time over which evolutionary changes have occurred. Even those
changes that, on the evolutionary scale,
are considered rapid took more time
than did domestication. Therefore, I do
not believe that we may consider conventional husbandry systems as natural
environments of the domestic pig.
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Is the (\ttempt to Adapt Pigs to
lntens1ve Husbandry Systems, in
the Same Degree as Pigs Are
Adapted to Conventional Systems
Realistic?
'
At this point, the descendants of
the first intensively kept pigs have lived
at most, for some 10 years under intensive conditions. Such a span of time
amounts to nothing compared with the
number of years that pigs have had the
potential to adapt to conventional systems. However, selection of these pigs,
with respect to the characteristic of harmony with the environment, has been
unconscious. Perhaps we can reach our
goal sooner by conscious selection. But
at the same time we must keep several
points in mind.
1. We must be careful not to select
only against particular symptom traits.
For instance, if we try to select against
tail-biting, it may turn out that we have
selected for blindness which, in this
case, amounts to a somewhat perverse
way of turning out the light. This sort of
danger is also present in our attempts to
adapt husbandry systems to the animals
but, because it is common in behavioral
genetics to select on the basis of just one
clearly defined parameter, the threat is far
greater in selection experiments. Therefore, we should combine selection experiments with intensive ethological and
physiological investigations of the animals under selection.
2. In genetics, selection is done
mostly on the basis of only a small number of isolated parameters. Selection on
this principle involves the danger that
the selected animals may no longer be in
harmony with themselves. For instance
if we select for large eggs, we do no~
simultaneously select (consciously) for a
larger cloaca width. This practice may
therefore cause a lot of suffering. To
keep animals in harmony with themselves,
we have to select for many traits at the
same time. However, this procedure
may interfere with production charac195
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changes that, on the evolutionary scale,
are considered rapid took more time
than did domestication. Therefore, I do
not believe that we may consider conventional husbandry systems as natural
environments of the domestic pig.
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Is the (\ttempt to Adapt Pigs to
lntens1ve Husbandry Systems, in
the Same Degree as Pigs Are
Adapted to Conventional Systems
Realistic?
'
At this point, the descendants of
the first intensively kept pigs have lived
at most, for some 10 years under intensive conditions. Such a span of time
amounts to nothing compared with the
number of years that pigs have had the
potential to adapt to conventional systems. However, selection of these pigs,
with respect to the characteristic of harmony with the environment, has been
unconscious. Perhaps we can reach our
goal sooner by conscious selection. But
at the same time we must keep several
points in mind.
1. We must be careful not to select
only against particular symptom traits.
For instance, if we try to select against
tail-biting, it may turn out that we have
selected for blindness which, in this
case, amounts to a somewhat perverse
way of turning out the light. This sort of
danger is also present in our attempts to
adapt husbandry systems to the animals
but, because it is common in behavioral
genetics to select on the basis of just one
clearly defined parameter, the threat is far
greater in selection experiments. Therefore, we should combine selection experiments with intensive ethological and
physiological investigations of the animals under selection.
2. In genetics, selection is done
mostly on the basis of only a small number of isolated parameters. Selection on
this principle involves the danger that
the selected animals may no longer be in
harmony with themselves. For instance
if we select for large eggs, we do no~
simultaneously select (consciously) for a
larger cloaca width. This practice may
therefore cause a lot of suffering. To
keep animals in harmony with themselves,
we have to select for many traits at the
same time. However, this procedure
may interfere with production charac195
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teristics. A parallel example is that of
many companion animal species: selected
traits often interfere with the normal
functioning of the animals.
3. Our goal may be too ambitious.
One may be impressed by the diversity
in form and behavior of, for example,
domestic dogs. However, closer investigation shows that all of the behavioral
elements of these domestic species were
already present in their wild ancestor,
but that varying aspects are differentially emphasized in the various breeds. As
discussed above, there is a wide gap between the natural environments of pigs
and conventional rearing systems. And
the gap between conventional and intensive systems seems to me to be much
larger. Pigs are rooting specialists, but
when kept under intensive conditions,
no substrate is provided for them to root
in. It is not surprising, then, that under
these intensive conditions many pigs exhibit behavior patterns that closely resemble those of psychiatric patients. On
the basis of extrapolation from our own
feelings, we can assume that the suffering of such animals is intense (Van Rooijen, 1981 a). Our attempt to select pigs
that are adapted to intensive husbandry
systems, to the same degree that pigs
are adapted to conventional systems,
may be more like an attempt to select a
duck out of a pigeon than selecting a
collie out of a wolf.
My conclusion is that we must first
perform small-scale experiments and gather sufficient information to see whether
our goal is realistic.

What Do Pigs That Are Adapted
to Intensive Husbandry Systems
Look Like?
Pigs kept intensively must prefer
pellets over acorns and, for the entire
day, they must prefer a bare, slatted
floor over one of straw. Of all species,
the niche of an intensively kept pig is
therefore perhaps most comparable to
196
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that of the storage ants of Myrmecocystus. The bodies of these insects are enormously distended from fluid food reserves
that are stored in their crops, and they
are permamently confined to the nest.
·other members of the colony tap them
for food, by inducing them to regurgitate
(Eisner and Wilson, 1975). In many respects, humans keep the environment of
the intensive-husbandry pig constant in
the same way. Therefore, we can consider the situation of these pigs similar
to that of those parasites that have lost
many of their capacities, because they
can rely on the homeostatic mechanisms
of their hosts. We may expect that, when
pigs have become totally adapted to life
. in intensive husbandry systems, they will
show many traits in common with internal parasites. Although it is theoretically
possible to adapt pigs to such an extreme extent, it is clear that this endeavor
is more unrealistic than the attempt to
adapt them to a degreesimilar to that of
pigs adapted to conventional systems.

Final Remarks
One has to keep in mind that we are
successfully preventing the whosesale
demise of the domestic animals living
under intensive conditions. And we may
assume that, never before in evolution,
have there been animals so disturbed
that they perform behavior patterns,
comparable to those of psychiatric patients that were nevertheless able to stay
alive,and breed successfully. In our intensive systems, this is made possible
only because we are assisted by various
techniques (e.g., regular food distribution,
artificial insemination, flat decks, etc.).
This means that, in this situation, it is not
likely that fitness and welfare coincide. I
do not understand what Beilharz meant
when he wrote about "obstructed and
misdirected evolutionary processes" because, from the viewpoint of evolution,
all directions are neutral. But if one
wants to use these terms, the care and
/NT I STUD ANIM PROB 4[3) 1983
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protection we give to animals may be
considered as a form of evolution that is
"obstructed and misdirected," inasmuch as
their final consequence is that fitness and
welfare do not coincide.
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